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Abstract
The effect of forest institution connectedness, incentive participation program,
and social capital on public participation and welfare as mediators of forest man-
agement were conducted in the forest conservation area of Baluran National Park,
East Java, Indonesia. The problem facing this area is that the five buffer villages of
Wonorejo, Sumber Waru, Sumber Anyar, Bajul Mati, and Watu Kebo exploit the
forest’s resources for their own economic reasons. The purposes of this research are
to analyze and explain: (1) the effect of the forest institutions connectedness on
public participation; (2) how welfare mediates forest institutions connectedness to
public participation; (3) the effect of incentive participation programs on public
participation; (4) how welfare mediates the effect of incentive participation pro-
grams on public participation; (5) the social effect capital on public participation;
(6) how welfare mediates social capital’s effect toward public participation; and
(7) welfare’s effect on public participation. The survey method and questionnaires
were used for a proportional random sampling of 170 respondents. They are 120
households that were members of the forestry community training center and 50
respondents from the staff of Baluran National Park. Validity and reliability testing
of instruments and hypothesis were performed using WarpPLS 5.0 software. The
results show: (1) forest institutions connectedness to public participation does not
contribute positive significant effect; (2) the effect of forest institution that is
related to public participation has been fully mediated by welfare; (3) incentive
participation programs have a positive significant effect on public participation;
(4) welfare partially mediates the effect of incentive participation programs on
public participation; (5) social capital has a positive significant effect on public
participation; (6) welfare mediates social capital’s effect on public participation;
and (7) welfare has a positive significant effect toward optimizing public participa-
tion in forest conservation management in the Baluran National Park. Practical
implications of this research are: (1) the contribution of nontimber forest products
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as a proportion of families’ income is between 12.99% and 28.46%; and (2) based on
the classification of public participation especially in four programs (participation
in planning program, implementation, benefit-sharing, and evaluation and moni-
toring) that are low level at 47.1%, middle level at 33.5%, and high level at 19.4%.
Keywords: incentive participation program, social capital, welfare, public
participation, social forestry management
1. Introduction
A national park, as a forest conservation area, has a variety of flora and fauna
which can be relied upon to ensure the human survival for now and future [1]. The
majority of these parks have now faced threats and interferences such as encroach-
ment, and illegal cultivation continues to increase over time [2]. Threats and dis-
turbances in these areas are caused by various factors, namely (1) the institutions
role in forest conservation management and local population participation level of
the are still not optimum (especially in the case of those living around the forest);
(2) the lack awareness about the conservation area is still very low among local
people; (3) the education level of local people is low; and (4) there is a lack of
agricultural land [1, 3].
The forest destruction in Baluran National Park includes: (1) forest fires in 2014,
with 132 fires covering an area of around 2005.90 ha. Rather than natural factors,
the main causes of forest fires are local people not acting responsibly, a lack of
security personnel guarding the forest, and weak law enforcement. Forest fires
impact heavily on the flora and fauna. (2) Clearing activities as a result of 400 ha
being devoted to agricultural plants business. (3) Timber theft (as well as theft of
firewood, fruit tart, hazelnut, gebang trees, ornamental fish and over grassing)
especially in the Labuhan Merak resort. (4) Cattle grazing is a problem that is quite
prominent, especially in the areas of Karangtekok, Labuhan Merak, and Balanan
with about 3450 ha. Cattle grazing (cows and goats) is widespread, with an average
of 1447 head of cattle per day. As a result of this illegal grazing, the soil becomes
solid, which is harmful to plants and vegetation that could potentially be survival
disruption of the park, as well as deer, antelope, and bison (the unique wildlife of
Baluran National Park). (5) Local transmigration settlements since 1976, covering
an area of 57 ha in Pandean area of Wonorejo village. (6) Illegal encroachment and
the tilling of the soil. (7) Hunting of wildlife by people with firearms, snares,
poison, and sap that often occurs during the dry season. Various factors affect the
behavior and movement patterns of animals, including a limited source of drinking
water for animals, especially in the dry season. Based on the above phenomena, this
paper focuses on the damaged forest in the Baluran National Park, caused by the
poor level of public participation [4–6].
There are some previous studies which discuss public participation in the for-
estry management program. These include: (1) studies which explained the factors
affecting public participation in forestry management, because of the role of forest
institution connectedness by Baynes et al. [7], Muro and Namusonge [8] and Lise
[9], (2) the quality of forest institutions as good governance will be able to create
conditions of security, belief, trust, and economic welfare by Hans-Jurgen [10] and
Akib et al. [11], (3) the effects of incentive participation program for social forestry
management in increasing public participation by Adhikari et al. [12], Djamhuri
[13], and Kaseya and Kihonge [14], (4) incentive participation program effects in
relation to welfare Rahut et al. [15], William and Ayuk [16], Das and Sarker [17],
(5) the social capital effect on public participation by Sara et al. [18] and Sharpe
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[19], (6) social capital effect on public welfare by Grootaet [20] and Narayan and
Pritchett [21], (8) how welfare effect on public participation in development pro-
grams Rahut et al. [15] and Akamani and Hall [22].
The issue of differences in measurement of incentive participation program is a
gap in this research. Adhikari et al. [12] measured incentive participation program
with six indicators, they are: (1) access to forests and availability of forest products,
(2) financial support to supplement household income, (3) social security and
cohesion through local institution building, (4) investment in local community
infrastructure and development, (5) well-defined & enforced property rights over
forest resources assigned to the users, and (6) payment for environmental services.
The research’s purposes of Adhikari et al. [12] are: (1) to determine the relationships
between different incentive participation program and the level of public partici-
pation of user group members; (2) to explore how households might respond to any
changes in the incentive participation program, in terms of their decision to partic-
ipate in common property resource governance; and (3) to propose/recommend
how organizational incentive participation program can be better integrated in
order to induce more effective public participation of users in the governance and
management of property resources. The indicators of public participation were
measured based on (1) membership length; (2) representation on the executive
committee; (3) level of public participation in meetings, (4) in decision-making,
and (5) in implementation; and (6) overall benefits.
While Djamhuri [13] measured incentive participation program with seven indi-
cators, they are: (1) forest village population); (2) villages forests/WPH; (3) number
of forest village community (LMDH) trustee board members; (4) percentage of
Tumpang Sari Farmers on the LMDH trustee board; (5) tree coverage on foundation
of the LMDH; (6) current tree coverage; (7) trustee board members attendance of
routine meetings. The indicative numbers of LMDH trustee board members and
percentage of Tumpang Sari Farmers on LMDH trustee board consist of: (1) formal
education; (2) household annual income; (3) use of feed/fodder from state forest
land; and (4) use of firewood from forest land. Djamhuri [13] said Tumpang Sari is
an incentive participation program which is traditional in forest management. Gov-
ernment and society integration provides a better incentive participation program in
the hope that the public will be will contribute in the state forest management.
Kaseya and Kihonge [14] measured incentive participation program with three
indicators, they are: (1) civic education, (2) financial incentives both transport and
lunch allowances, and (3) scheduling of forums/meetings. The study result was
corroborated by the findings from the open interview which indicated that 62.5% of
the respondents concurred that financial incentives are offered to participants.
Measurements of incentive participation program in this research refers to [12], but
its indicators are based on research object conditions.
The second gap of this research is the differences of social capital’s measure-
ments done by Grootaet [20] and Narayan and Pritchett [21]. Grootaet [20] mea-
sured social capital into six dimension of social capital, they are: (1) density of
membership, (2) heterogeneity index, (3) meeting attendance, (4) decision making
index, (5) membership dues, and (6) community orientation.
Narayan and Pritchett [21] measured social capital into six variables, they are:
(1) heterogeneity members, (2) inclusiveness members, and (3) performances
members. Social capital’s indicators consist of: (1) membership, (2) characteristic of
membership; (3) values and individual’s behaviors.
Measurement of social capital in this study refers to Grootaet [20], who mea-
sures social capital as a factor in the reduction of poverty and increase in prosperity,
but indicators of social capital of this research based on research object condition.
Welfare provision would increase the role of public participation in development.
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Increased public participation will reduce transaction costs and the cost of control,
raise output and further improve the welfare of the community.
Rahut et al. [15] suggested increasing public participation in collaborative forest
management (CFM) while adding welfare as a mediation variable which will affect
social capital and also affect public participation.
The novelty of research are: (1) to examine the integrative model with purposes
to insure weather forest institution connectedness, incentive participation program,
social capital and public welfare still have positive significant effect on public
participation; (2) to analyze the level of public participation based on participation
in planning program, implementation, benefit-sharing; and evaluation and moni-
toring of the forest conservation management in Baluran National Park.
After all, the purposes of this study that were presented here will be to analyze
and explain: (1) effect of the forest institutions’ connectedness to public participa-
tion; (2) how welfare mediates forest institution connectedness to public participa-
tion; (3) the effect of incentive participation programs on public participation; (4)
how welfare mediates the effects of incentive participation programs on public
participation; (5) social capital’s effect on public participation; (6) how welfare
mediates social capital’s effect on public participation; and (7) welfare’s effect on
public participation.
2. Material and method
Data were collected during July–December 2017 through interview, research
questionnaires, and documentation. Interview was conducted to determine the
respondents’ answers to a questionnaire relating to the variables that have been
used in this study.
The sampling method is proportional random sampling. The unit analysis is the
heads-of-household who are members of the forestry community training center
(120 people) and the staff of Baluran National Park with 50 people. All of them are
170 respondents in total (see Table 1). The construct validity of reflective indicators
were tested based on convergent validity, discriminant validity, composite reliabil-
ity [23]. Variable with formative indicators were tested based on the values of full
collinearity variances inflations factor.
The method of data analysis used in this study is structural equation modeling
usingWarpPLS 5.0. This research is based on working with numbers, and the data are
tangible, analyzed using statistics to test hypotheses or answer specific research ques-
tions and to make predictions that a particular variable affects other variables [24].
To test mediation roles the causal-step approach of Baron and Kenny was used.
The best way to test for mediation effects is by counting the Variance Accounted For
(VAF) value, which can determine the indirect effect relative to the total effect [25].
According to Baron and Kenny [26] the causal step approach has four mediation
effects, they are: (1) nonmediation, if VAF value < 20%; (2) partial mediation, if VAF
value is around 20 ≤ 80%; (3) full mediation, if VAF value > 80%; and (4) suppressed
mediation, if the direct effect sign changed after inclusion of the mediation variable.
3. Result and discussion
3.1 Validity test
The validation of reflective indicators was done through: (1) convergent
validity; (2) discriminant validity; and (3) reliability test consists of (a) indicator
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reliability; and (b) consistency internal reliability both composite reliability and
Cronbach alpha [23].
3.2 Convergent validity
Convergent validity testing is performed to identify the items of instrument
indicators as indicators from a latent variable (see Table 2). The convergent valid-
ity test result shown that all of the outer loading values are more than 0.6 (>0.6). At
last, it can be seen that this research has met the requirements of the convergent
validity [23, 25].
Table 1.
Sample size of the Forestry Community Training Center and The Staff of Baluran National Park (BNP).
Table 2.
Convergent validity test.
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3.3 Discriminant validity
A discriminant validity test (Table 3) was performed after those for convergent
validity. It is to identify the validity of instrument items in a model [27]. The
discriminant construct validity test will meet the criteria of the discriminant valid-
ity if the square roots of AVE are higher than the variable correlation score. KLM
(X1) has a square root of AVE 0.793 is more than its correlation 0.669, 0.281, 0.669.
ISN (X2) is 0.938, its correlation scores are 0.669, 0.299, and 0.681. MDS (X3) is
0.755, and its correlation scores are 0.281, 0.299, and 0.304. PAR (Z1) is 0.892, and
its correlation scores are 0.669, 0.681, and 0.304. The criteria of discriminant
validity are therefore met [23, 25]
3.4 Reliability test
Reliability test (Table 4) consist of indicator reliability and consistency internal
reliability both composite reliability and Cronbach alpha. The reliability test shows
that all of the outer loadings are >0.6, and p-value is <0.001 less than 0.05, which
means all instruments are reliable [23, 25].
3.5 Consistency internal reliability
Consistency internal reliability was tested both for composite reliability, and
Cronbach alpha. The consistency of internal reliability values in this study also more
than 0.60 (>0.60), and are thus reliable (Table 5).
3.6 Composite reliability
The composite reliability coefficients values in this research are more than 0.70
(see Table 5). All variables meet reliability requirements [23]. The value for KLM
(forest institution connectedness) is 0.846, ISN (incentive participation program) is
0.967, MDS (social capital) is 0.868, and PAR (public participation) is 0.940.
3.7 Cronbach alpha
Internal consistency test (Table 6) can be proved by the exact Cronbach alpha
values. The Cronbach alpha are as follows: KLM (X1) is 0.770, ISN (X2) is 0.951,
MDS (X3) is 0.809, and PAR (Z1) is 0.914. The criteria for internal consistency are
therefore met [25].
3.8 Indicator reliability
The indicator reliability test (Table 7) was done in order to ensure the quality of
variable with formative indicators. This test result can be gained from the signifi-
cant of weights or indicator weights. All of the formative indicators have met the
Table 3.
Discriminant validity test.
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requirement of indicator reliability with a p-value less than 0.05 (<0.05) and all
instruments are valid [23, 25].
3.9 Collinearity
Variable with formative indicators will meet the requirements of collinearity, if
the value of variances inflation factor (VIF) is <3.3. KSJ (Welfare) is a latent
variable of welfare with four formative indicators, and has the value of variance
inflation factor is 2.527 less than 3.3.
Table 4.
Indicators reliability test.
Table 5.
Composite reliability coefficients.
Table 6.
Internal consistency test (Cronbach’s alpha of each variable).
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3.10 Partial least square analysis
Goodness of fit (inner model) can be evaluated based on R-squared, adj. R-
squared, Cronbach alpha, Avg. Var. Ectrac, full collinearity VIF, and Q-squared
value (see Table 8). R-squared with high value means the model is good and R-
squared can be used for response variable.
The results of R-squared for the public participation (PAR) is 0.979 which
means that the contribution of the variables incentive participation program (ISN),
social capital (MDS), and welfare (KSJ) to the effect on public participation (PAR)
is 97.9%, and the remaining 2.1% is attributable to another variable outside the
research model.
Composite reliability value and Cronbach alpha can be used to evaluate research
instruments. Based on the output, the composite reliability coefficients are 0.846
for KLM, 0.967 for ISN, 0.868 for MDS, 0.907 for KSJ and 0.940 for PAR. They are
more than 0.60 and the Cronbach alpha coefficients are 0.770, 0.951, 0.809, 0.861,
and 9.14. All of them are more 0.70 for all variables. Therefore, all variables in this
research have met the reliability criteria.
The average variances extracted (AVE) is used to evaluate the discriminant
validity, with the criterion that values must be >0.50. The AVE values are as
follows: (1) forest institution connectedness (KLM) variable is 0.543; (2) incentive
participation program (ISN) variable is 0.880; (2) social capital (MDS) variable is
0.571; (3) welfare (KSJ) variable is 0.713; and (4) public participation (PAR) vari-
able is 0.795. All the variables met the AVE value criterion >0.50 and meet the
discriminant validity.
Full collinearity VIFs is a complete collinearity test consisting of vertical and
lateral multicollinearity. Lateral collinearity is a collinearity between a predictor
latent variable and criteria variables and can be used to test the common method
bias. The criterion for the full collinearity test values <3.3. This research has met the
full collinearity requirements for all variables; they are 2.228 for KLM, 2.254 for
ISN, 1.126 for MDS, and 2.527 for KSJ.
Q-squared is used as a predictive test of the relation between the predictor latent
variables and the criterion variables. The Q-squared result can be negative, but the
R-squared result must be positive. The estimation result of this output above shows
good predictive value; at 0.708 and 0.852, values are more than zero (Table 8).
3.11 Loading factor (outer model)
The outer loading values are used to know indicator’s weight of every variable.
Indicators with high outer loading values show they are strong variable measures
(Table 9). Forest institutions’ connectedness variable is consist of five indicators
(accountability, transparency, belief-based relationship, forest rules, and informa-
tion access) are categorized as not good condition (3.86 < 4.00). The highest outer
loading is forest rules (0.803) and means score (4.00) is reflected as good condition.
But the lowest mean score is accountability (3.71) is reflected as not good condition
and effects the level of public participation.
Table 7.
Indicator reliability test of indicator weights.
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Incentive participation program variable consist of four indicators (incentive
participation programs of training, agriculture tools, cash payment, and agriculture
land use) are categorized as not good conditions (3.81 < 4.00). The highest outer
loading is the incentive participation program of agriculture tools (0.986), mean
score (3.97), but it is still reflected not good condition (<4.00). The lowest mean
score is the incentive participation program of training (3.67) is reflected as not
good condition and effects the level of public participation, especially in developing
the quality of human resources.
The social capital variable is consist of five indicators (reciprocity, social norms,
network interaction, level of trust in the community group, and buffer villages
group donations) are categorized as not good conditions (3.93 < 4.00). The highest
outer loading is social norms (0.819) and means score is (4.21) is reflected as good
condition. But the lowest mean score is buffer village group’s donation (3.64) is
reflected as not good condition and effects the level of public participation.
Welfare variable is consist of five indicators (household income, household
education, household health, and household supporting facilities) are categorized as
not good condition (3.81 < 4.00). The highest outer loading is family income
(0.877) and mean score (3.86) is reflected as not good condition and effects the
level of public participation (<4.00). The lowest mean score is family supporting
facilities (3.73) is reflected as not good condition and effects the level of public
participation.
Public participation variable is consist of four indicators (participation in plan-
ning program, participation in implementation, participation in benefit-sharing,
and participation in monitoring and evaluation) are categorized as not good condi-
tion with average score is 3.85 or less than 4.00. The highest outer loading is
participation in implementation (0.915) and mean score (3.85). The lowest mean
score is participation in planning program (3.68) is reflected as not good condition.
3.12 Path coefficients and P values
Path coefficients and p values (Table 10) and direct hypothesis (Table 11) that:
(H1a) KLM (forest institutions’ connectedness) does not have a positive significant
effect (0.087) on public participation, with p-value 0.166; (H1b) KSJ (Welfare)
mediates the effect of KLM (forest institution connectedness) on public participa-
tion (0.552), with p-value <0.001; (H2a) INS (incentive participation program)
has shown a positive significant effect (0.196) on public participation (p-value
0.013); (H2b) welfare (KSJ) mediates the effect of ISN (incentive participation
program) (0.273) on public participation with p-value <0.001; (H3a)MDS (social
capital) has a positive significant effect (0.141) on public participation, with
p-value 0.056; (H3b) welfare (KSJ) mediates the effect of MDS (social capital) on
public participation (0.177), with p-value 0.023; (H4) welfare (KSJ) has a positive
significant effect (0.782) on public participation with p-value <0.001.
Table 8.
Output latent variable coefficients.
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3.13 Directional hypothesis
Forest institutions’ connectedness does not have a positive significant effect
(0.087) on public participation, with p-value 0.166. Because p-value 0.166 is more
than 0.05 (0.166 > 0.05), H1a is not accepted. This test result does not provide
empirical support for the findings of Baynes et al. [7], Muro and Namusonge [8],
and Lise [9].
The incentive participation program has a positive significant effect (0.196) on
public participation, with p-value 0.013. Because p-value 0.013 is less than 0.5
Table 9.
Outer loading value of variable.
Table 10.
Path coefficients and P values.
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(0.013 < 0.05), H2a is accepted. The results support the theory of incentive partic-
ipation programs of Robbin [28], Adhikari et al. [12], Djamhuri [13], and Kaseya
and Kihonge [14].
Social capital gives significant positive effect on public participation (0.1401),
with p-value 0.056. Because p-value 0.056 is less than 0.05 (0.056 < 0.5), H3a is
accepted. The test results support the theory of social capita [29], as well as
supporting the empirical research of Sara [18] and Sharpe [19].
3.14 Indirect effect hypothesis
Path coefficient indirect effect (Table 12) shows that welfare mediates the effect
of forest institution on public participation (0.552), with p-value <0.001. Because
p-value <0.001 is less than 0.05 (<0.001 < 0.5), hypothesis H1b is accepted. The
test results provide empirical support for the work of Hans-Jurgen [10] and Akib
et al. [11].
Welfare mediates incentive participation program on public participation
(0.273), with p-value < 0.001, less than 0.05 (<0.001 < 0.5). Hypothesis H2b is
thus accepted. The test results provide empirical support for the work of Rahut et al.
[15], William and Ayuk [16], Das and Sarker [17].
Social capital by the mediation of welfare has a positive significant effect on
public participation (0.177), with p-value 0.023, less than 0.05 (0.023 < 0.5).
Hypothesis H3b is therefore accepted. The results are related to the social capital
theory [20]. In addition, Fukuyama [30] added that the social capital and the level
of welfare are closely related in a community or nation [29]. This result provides
empirical support for the research of Grootaet [20], Narayan and Pritchett [21].
Welfare contributes significant positive effect on public participation by 0.782
on public participation, with p-value <0.001. Because p-value <0.001 is less than
0.05 (<0.001 < 0.5), hypothesis H4 is accepted. This test provides empirical sup-
port for the research of Rahut et al. [15] and Akamani and Hall [22].
3.15 Mediation effect analysis
To test mediation effect, this research uses Baron and Kenny’s causal-step
approach. Baron and Kenny [26] using causal step approach which has four media-
tion effects, they are: (a) first step, directional hypothesis if the results are signifi-
cant/positive; (b) second step, the indirect hypothesis was tested whether it is
significant/positive; (c) third step, test mediation effects using VAF (Variance
Accounted For) with the criteria: VAF value >80% means full mediation,
20% ≤ VAF ≤80% means partial mediation; and VAF < 20% means no mediation.
The mediation effect is significant/positive if p-value indirect effect is less
than 0.05 [25].
Figure 1 shows that all of the direct effects are significant/positive because the
p-values are less than 0.05. Then the indirect effects (mediation variables) are
included, as shown in Figure 2.
Table 11.
Direct hypothesis.
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Figure 2 shows all of the indirect effects are significant/positive because p-
values are less than 0.05. The third step is to test mediation effect by using the VAF
formula. The formula of VAF = (p12  p23)/(p12  p23 + p13). The results of the
mediation test using the VAF method are as follows:
1. Forest institutions’ connectedness effect on public participation in the
mediation of welfare is significant and positive with p-value <0.001 (<0.05)
Figure 1.
Direct effect without including mediation.
Figure 2.
Indirect effect including mediation.
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VAF = (0.552  0.782)/(0.552  0.782 + 0.087).
VAF = 0.431/0.518.
VAF = 0.832.
VAF = 83.2%.
This means that welfare mediates the effect of forest institutions’ connectedness on
public participation as a full mediation.
2. Incentive participation program’s effect on public participation in the
mediation of welfare is significant and positive, with p-value <0.001 (<0.05)
VAF = (0.273  0.782)/(0.273  0.782 + 0.196).
VAF = 0.213/0.409.
VAF = 0.520.
VAF = 52.0%.
This means that welfare mediates incentive participation program’s effect on public
participation as a partial mediation.
3. Social capital’s effect on public participation in the mediation of welfare is
significant and positive, with p-value 0.023 (<0.05)
VAF = (0.177  0.782)/(0.177  0.782 + 0.141).
VAF = 0.138/0.279.
VAF = 0.494.
VAF = 49.4%.
This means welfare mediates social capital’s effect on public participation as a
partial mediation.
Based on the descriptive analysis, both direct and indirect hypothesis results
(Tables 11 and 12), for all variables can be summarized in Table 13.
3.16 Analysis of public participation and welfare as mediator of forest
management
The analysis of public participation in this research is based on the characteris-
tics of five buffer villages. They are Wonorejo, Sumber Waru, Sumber Anyar, Watu
Kebo and Bajul Mati.
The buffer villages have potential to be developed into bigger villages. Manage-
ment of regions is required in order to avoid disturbing the forest conservation in
Baluran National Park.
The contribution of nontimber forest product (NTFP) to family income is
around 19.79% up and 61.44% of their total annual income (Table 14).
Table 12.
Path coefficient indirect effect.
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This research also empirically supports research from Baluran [5] and Syafi’i [31].
The total income of user’s forest product in buffer villages of Baluran National Park
is about Rp. 100,900,000 a year.
3.17 Public participation in the forestry planning program in Baluran National
park
The people in the buffer villages have not been widely involved in the forestry
management planning (shown in Table 15). Their participation in decision making
in the meeting of the forestry planning program by forestry community training
center is 28.2%, and by Forest Institution of Baluran National Park is 20.6%.
3.18 Public participation in the implementation program
The members of Forestry Community Training Center participated by giving
inputs of the forestry planning program in BNP (23.5%) and giving efforts and
actions of the forestry planning program (17.6%) as shown in Table 16.
Table 13.
Hypothesis test results, summary of direct and indirect effect.
Table 14.
Contribution of nontimber forest product (NTFP) on family income.
Table 15.
Public participation in the forestry planning program in Baluran National Park.
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3.19 Public participation in benefit sharing
The members of the Forestry Community Training Center have participated in
the benefit-sharing from forestry management to increase their family’s income
with value 21.8%, and have participated in forest conservation management with
value 17.1% (Table 17).
3.20 Public participation in evaluation and monitoring
Table 18 shows that 17.6% of members of Forestry Community Training Center
has participated in the evaluation of Baluran Forest in Baluran National Park, and
22.4% have participated in the monitoring of forest conservation.
3.21 Classification of public participation in forestry management in Baluran
National Park
According to Cohen [32], the level of public participation is high when people
involved in four stages of the management process. They are (1) program planning
participation; (2) actuating participation; (3) benefit-sharing participation; and (4)
evaluation and monitoring participation. Scores > 21 indicate high level, 17–21
medium level, and <17 low-level participation [32].
Table 16.
Public participation in implementing program.
Table 17.
Public participation of benefit sharing.
Table 18.
Public participation in evaluation and monitoring.
15
The Effect of Forest Institution Connectedness, Incentive Participation Program, and Social…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.84674
Table 19 shows that public participation from the five buffer villages
(Wonorejo, Sumber Waru, Sumber Anyar, Bajul Mati, and Watu Kebo) is low level
at 47.1%, the middle level at 33.5%, and high level 19.4%.
4. Conclusions
Based on the research findings, several conclusions can be stated as follows.
Public welfare is the most important factor in forest management. Especially in the
Baluran National Park, that the public welfare is the main factor affecting public
participation. That is why, the public participation will increase if: (1) there is a
good relationship between the forest institution connectedness and local people and
make them welfare and better in their life than before; (2) the forest institution
provide incentive participation program that can increase the local people’s
welfare and better in their life; (3) there is a good social capital that can increase the
local people’s welfare because they are more having skills, experiences and
productivity; (4) the public welfare always increase and make their life better;
(5) public welfare is the most important factor to increase public participation in
forest management; (6) the contribution of nontimber forest product (NTFP) to
family income getting increased; (7) the forest institutions give opportunities
to member of forestry community training center in the forestry planning
program, implementing program, benefit sharing, and evaluation and
monitoring. Classification of public participation in forestry management in the
Baluran National Park shows that the public participation needs to be
increased (19.4%).
5. Policy recommendations
Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are pro-
posed:
1. The forest institution of Baluran National Park should improve its relationship
between the institution connectedness and local people. Because of this, the
institution should know what the local people needs.
2. The forest institution should increase the incentive participation program
(incentive participation program of training), because it effects the level of
public participation;
3. The social capital should be improved to create the local people’s welfare by
giving incentive participation program of training in order to improve the
skills, experiences and productivity of local people;
Table 19.
Classification of public participation in forestry management in Baluran National Park.
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4.The forest institution of Baluran National Park should improve the public
welfare by focusing it on each planning program of forest management;
5. The contribution of nontimber forest product (NTFP) to family income must
be increased;
6.The forest institutions give opportunities to member of forestry community
training center in the forestry planning program, implementing program,
benefit sharing, and evaluation and monitoring. Classification of public
participation in forestry management in the Baluran National Park shows that
the public participation needs to be increased (19.4%).
7. Future research should develop socio-demography variable as a predictor
variable of public participation in optimizing the level of public participation
as many researchers using it in their study.
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